Aa
"War Criminals Shouldn’t Be Honored":
Rutgers Students Nix Condoleezza Rice from Commencement Speech
Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has withdrawn as commencement speaker at Rutgers University following protests by faculty and students over her role in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Rutgers faculty had circulated a petition decrying the role Rice played in "efforts to mislead the American people about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq." Last week, Rutgers students occupied a campus building in a call for the invitation to be withdrawn. In a statement this weekend, Rice said her appearance "has become a distraction." We discuss the "No Rice Campaign" with Rutgers University student protester Carmelo Cintrón Vivas and Baher Azmy, legal director of the Center for Constitutional Rights.
cont@
http://www.democracynow.org/2014/5/5/war_criminals_shouldnt_be_honored_rutgers
Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has withdrawn as commencement speaker at Rutgers University following protests by faculty and students over her role in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Rutgers faculty had circulated a petition decrying the role Rice played in "efforts to mislead the American people about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq." Last week, Rutgers students occupied a campus building in a call for the invitation to be withdrawn. In a statement this weekend, Rice said her appearance "has become a distraction." We discuss the "No Rice Campaign" with Rutgers University student protester Carmelo Cintrón Vivas and Baher Azmy, legal director of the Center for Constitutional Rights.
cont@
http://www.democracynow.org/2014/5/5/war_criminals_shouldnt_be_honored_rutgers
You wanted us out, were out... have a coke and a smile.
Iraq's house of cards
By Zaid al-Ali
Published: May 2, 2014
{..... Maliki and his inner circle have also exacerbated security risks through a series of elementary mistakes, including subjecting thousands of innocent young men to unjustified detention and allowing corruption to get so out of hand that it has now seriously impacted the capacity of the security sector. Military units and police throughout the country now either stand aside or actively participate as local mafias force businesses to pay protection money.
Security forces in the capital are still forced to use fake bomb detectors simply so that the government (which was responsible for buying the devices) can save face. The result is that the number of security-related deaths has roughly tripled over the past year, as car bombs continue to rip through army units and civilian areas with ruthless efficiency. Meanwhile, armed confrontations between gunmen and government forces have become more frequent.
Security has deteriorated so terribly that Iraq is now once again at risk of splitting apart. Many areas of the country are now out of the government's control: Large swaths of the western province of Anbar are in open rebellion; security forces have essentially given up trying to control parts of the northern province of Nineveh, which has become a major financial hub for terrorist organizations; and the eastern province of Diyala has witnessed another round of brutal bloodletting as militias and government forces shell civilian areas.
The state's army and police have revealed themselves to be little more than a paper tiger. They are very willing to arrest and torture the innocent and defenseless, but are essentially powerless to control the actions of powerful militias that are now running riot throughout the country. With security forces incapable of facing the threat, Shiite militias have actually begun providing instructions to the military — sometimes even replacing them in battle altogether. These developments have exposed Maliki's strongman image as the house of cards it always was.
The prime minister's supporters regularly refer admiringly to his capacity for survival, but it is precisely Maliki's stubborn insistence that he should remain in control of government that has hindered the provision of services. Hospitals are in such a poor state that Iraqi doctors would never imagine turning to one of their colleagues for treatment; they travel to any number of capitals in the region for even minor ailments.
Electricity production has improved only slightly, to the extent that summers and winters are still invariably punctuated by daily power cuts, some of which can last for days. Rather than trying to resolve these problems, Maliki has allowed a grotesque form of nepotism to gnaw away at the state's bureaucracy, marginalizing the few competent officials who survived Baath Party rule and Iraq's wars.
These failures also have served to prevent alternatives to the status quo from emerging. Maliki's greatest success may have been creating the impression that he is indispensable — that the state will collapse if the man in charge is removed. The truth is that what makes Maliki and his clique indispensable is their willingness to burn the whole house down to protect their positions.
In fact, many competent politicians are far better placed than Maliki and his inner circle to guide the country to a better place. Iraq does not lack competent administrators or politicians — it merely lacks the democratic traditions that would allow them to play a greater role in revitalizing its moribund government.
Several names come immediately to mind: Mohammed Allawi, a former communications minister who resigned in protest when Maliki kept appointing incompetent party loyalists to his ministry; Ali Allawi, a former defense and finance minister who left government in 2006 in disgust at the corruption; Adel Abdul Mahdi, a respected politician who could have sufficient backing to form a government; and Ali Dwai, a governor of a southern province who is renowned for his effectiveness in very difficult circumstances.
While Maliki may want observers to fear that his departure would cause a security deterioration, the truth is that life in Iraq is already becoming more desperate by the day — in large part because of the toxic role that Maliki has been playing. Sectarian relations have worsened considerably, and the general population is terrified of a renewed conflict.
A change at the country's helm is needed precisely in order to restore the possibility of an improvement in the country's direction; with Maliki, that possibility does not exist. For Iraqis to place their trust in the possibility that he might change his style of governance after eight years in power would be borderline suicidal.
There is in fact a serious possibility that Maliki will not obtain sufficient popular support to retain his position. His electoral popularity peaked at around 24 percent of the vote in 2010, when many Iraqis still believed in his nonsectarian and strongman credentials. However, Iraq's complex and dysfunctional parliamentary system has allowed him to negotiate his survival.
This election season, Maliki's fortunes will necessarily decline from the previous poll — the only questions are by how much and how his electoral rivals will react. After the votes are counted, Iraq's future will depend on its leaders' ability to form a post-election alliance without the country's most corrosive elements at its helm.}
http://www.stripes.com/opinion/iraq-s-house-of-cards-1.281035
By Zaid al-Ali
Published: May 2, 2014
{..... Maliki and his inner circle have also exacerbated security risks through a series of elementary mistakes, including subjecting thousands of innocent young men to unjustified detention and allowing corruption to get so out of hand that it has now seriously impacted the capacity of the security sector. Military units and police throughout the country now either stand aside or actively participate as local mafias force businesses to pay protection money.
Security forces in the capital are still forced to use fake bomb detectors simply so that the government (which was responsible for buying the devices) can save face. The result is that the number of security-related deaths has roughly tripled over the past year, as car bombs continue to rip through army units and civilian areas with ruthless efficiency. Meanwhile, armed confrontations between gunmen and government forces have become more frequent.
Security has deteriorated so terribly that Iraq is now once again at risk of splitting apart. Many areas of the country are now out of the government's control: Large swaths of the western province of Anbar are in open rebellion; security forces have essentially given up trying to control parts of the northern province of Nineveh, which has become a major financial hub for terrorist organizations; and the eastern province of Diyala has witnessed another round of brutal bloodletting as militias and government forces shell civilian areas.
The state's army and police have revealed themselves to be little more than a paper tiger. They are very willing to arrest and torture the innocent and defenseless, but are essentially powerless to control the actions of powerful militias that are now running riot throughout the country. With security forces incapable of facing the threat, Shiite militias have actually begun providing instructions to the military — sometimes even replacing them in battle altogether. These developments have exposed Maliki's strongman image as the house of cards it always was.
The prime minister's supporters regularly refer admiringly to his capacity for survival, but it is precisely Maliki's stubborn insistence that he should remain in control of government that has hindered the provision of services. Hospitals are in such a poor state that Iraqi doctors would never imagine turning to one of their colleagues for treatment; they travel to any number of capitals in the region for even minor ailments.
Electricity production has improved only slightly, to the extent that summers and winters are still invariably punctuated by daily power cuts, some of which can last for days. Rather than trying to resolve these problems, Maliki has allowed a grotesque form of nepotism to gnaw away at the state's bureaucracy, marginalizing the few competent officials who survived Baath Party rule and Iraq's wars.
These failures also have served to prevent alternatives to the status quo from emerging. Maliki's greatest success may have been creating the impression that he is indispensable — that the state will collapse if the man in charge is removed. The truth is that what makes Maliki and his clique indispensable is their willingness to burn the whole house down to protect their positions.
In fact, many competent politicians are far better placed than Maliki and his inner circle to guide the country to a better place. Iraq does not lack competent administrators or politicians — it merely lacks the democratic traditions that would allow them to play a greater role in revitalizing its moribund government.
Several names come immediately to mind: Mohammed Allawi, a former communications minister who resigned in protest when Maliki kept appointing incompetent party loyalists to his ministry; Ali Allawi, a former defense and finance minister who left government in 2006 in disgust at the corruption; Adel Abdul Mahdi, a respected politician who could have sufficient backing to form a government; and Ali Dwai, a governor of a southern province who is renowned for his effectiveness in very difficult circumstances.
While Maliki may want observers to fear that his departure would cause a security deterioration, the truth is that life in Iraq is already becoming more desperate by the day — in large part because of the toxic role that Maliki has been playing. Sectarian relations have worsened considerably, and the general population is terrified of a renewed conflict.
A change at the country's helm is needed precisely in order to restore the possibility of an improvement in the country's direction; with Maliki, that possibility does not exist. For Iraqis to place their trust in the possibility that he might change his style of governance after eight years in power would be borderline suicidal.
There is in fact a serious possibility that Maliki will not obtain sufficient popular support to retain his position. His electoral popularity peaked at around 24 percent of the vote in 2010, when many Iraqis still believed in his nonsectarian and strongman credentials. However, Iraq's complex and dysfunctional parliamentary system has allowed him to negotiate his survival.
This election season, Maliki's fortunes will necessarily decline from the previous poll — the only questions are by how much and how his electoral rivals will react. After the votes are counted, Iraq's future will depend on its leaders' ability to form a post-election alliance without the country's most corrosive elements at its helm.}
http://www.stripes.com/opinion/iraq-s-house-of-cards-1.281035
You don't have to be a genius to see the stupidity in the article you posted Brice. It's patently clear to anyone who has paid attention to the Iraq situation.
"To the contrary, Iraqis now have a chance, denied them under Saddam, to forge a new society, as Germany and Japan did after World War II."
Yeah, and how has that "new society" been working out for the Iraqis?
Iraq, three years after U.S. withdrawal
Things are not going well
By Frances Weaver | May 10, 2014
{How bad is the situation?
It's extremely grim. When U.S. soldiers withdrew in 2011, President Obama boasted they were "leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq." Three years later, the country is under the thumb of an authoritarian ruler, riddled with corruption, and trapped in horrific sectarian violence. Nearly every day, mammoth explosions rock the capital, Baghdad, and other cities, tearing apart restaurants, public markets, and government buildings; in April alone, 750 Iraqis were killed in bombings or in the fighting between government forces and a formidable Sunni extremist insurgency. If the increasingly authoritarian Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki manages to secure victory in April 30's parliamentary elections — the results of which will not be known for weeks — it could ignite a full-fledged civil war. "We were happy when the old dictator went," said Ramadi resident Faleh Shahooth, referring to the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein. "But democracy has brought a new dictator. If the election produces the same thieves again, then it's time for revolution."
What kind of leader is al-Maliki?
In power since 2006, al-Maliki secured re-election in 2010 by promising to form a national "unity" government with his rivals from the Sunni minority, who had previously governed Iraq under Saddam's Ba'athist regime. But within days of America's withdrawal, al-Maliki instigated a brutal crackdown on Sunnis from his vice president downward, purging the Iraqi National Intelligence Service and the government of sectarian rivals. Tens of thousands of political prisoners now wallow in Iraq's jails, while al-Maliki — who has declared himself commander in chief — has built up a series of intelligence files on his political opponents, ready to "call them out," in his words, if they dare criticize him. "Maliki could have been a historic figure," said former Vice President Adil Abdul-Mahdi. "The Shiites supported him; he had the support of the Sunnis and the Kurds." Instead, he has alienated large swaths of the population, and opened the door to a resurgence of Islamic militants. Jihadists from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), an al Qaeda–affiliated organization, are now firmly in control of Anbar province, the hard-won western Sunni heartland where some 1,300 U.S. soldiers lost their lives. ISIS is also waging war in neighboring Syria as part of a wider regional Sunni-Shiite struggle.
What about corruption?
It's blatant and widespread. In fact, al-Maliki's government has become a symbol of bribery and theft, with corrupt politicians siphoning off millions of dollars' worth of oil revenues from within the comfort of Baghdad's Green Zone. Abdul-Mahdi estimates that almost $220 billion has been allocated in the last few years to some 6,000 shady government projects, and another $70 billion in government loans has been handed out without being repaid. "The corruption is unbelievable," says political scientist Ghassan al-Atiyyah. "You can't get a job in the army or the government unless you pay; you can't even get out of prison unless you pay." That, combined with a dire lack of public services — including constant electricity shortages — has led to the sense that the overall standard of life in Iraq has only deteriorated since Saddam was toppled.
Are women at least better off?
Their political situation has improved: Under Iraq's postwar constitution, women are guaranteed 25 percent of the seats in parliament. But as conservative Shiite forces have gained a foothold within the government, the average female Iraqi has found herself with fewer rights than under Saddam. More than a quarter of women over the age of 12 in Iraq are illiterate; only 14 percent are either working or actively seeking employment. Perhaps the greatest symbol of Iraqi women's plight today is the Jaafari Personal Status Law, draft legislation approved by Iraq's Council of Ministers in February that lowers the marriage age for girls to 9, forbids women from leaving their homes without their husbands' consent, and legalizes marital rape. "This law means humiliation for women and for Iraqis in general," said female legislator Safia al-Suhail. "It shows that we are going backwards."
Will the elections change anything?
That all depends on who wins. If al-Maliki gets a plurality of votes and remains prime minister, more division and bloodshed are inevitable. He has already insisted he will use all his "energy and effort" to keep his fellow Shiites in full control, and spurn a "unity" coalition government with his Sunni and Kurdish rivals. Having painted himself as a heroic fighter against the Sunni "terrorists," al-Maliki enjoys significant support among the Shiite population, but is widely loathed among Sunnis, who see him as a despot and Iranian stooge. Backroom negotiations to select a prime minister are expected to take months, during which time al-Maliki is likely to use his considerable influence over Iraq's judiciary to get his desired result. "If we know anything about Prime Minister Maliki," said Ahmed Ali, an Iraq analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, "it's that he doesn't retreat easily."
The Kurdish success story
One part of Iraq has proved a surprising exception to the country's grim norm: the semi-autonomous Kurdish region, which lies 200 miles north of Baghdad. Kurdish Iraq is largely peaceful, prosperous, democratic, and secular. Corruption exists, but at a tolerable level: "In Kurdistan, the leaders steal about 20 percent," a Kurdish local told The New Yorker, "but 80 percent makes it to the people. In Baghdad, the percentages are reversed." Although already effectively independent from Iraq's central government, the Kurdish regional government has until this point eschewed formal independence in order to capitalize on Baghdad's oil revenues. But having apparently discovered its own huge oil reserves, the regional government is increasingly considering splitting with its violent southern neighbors. "We are talking about a culture of life," said Fuad Hussein, the Kurdish prime minister's chief of staff. "They are busy with a culture of death."}
http://theweek.com/article/index/261272/iraq-three-years-after-us-withdrawal
"To the contrary, Iraqis now have a chance, denied them under Saddam, to forge a new society, as Germany and Japan did after World War II."
Yeah, and how has that "new society" been working out for the Iraqis?
Iraq, three years after U.S. withdrawal
Things are not going well
By Frances Weaver | May 10, 2014
{How bad is the situation?
It's extremely grim. When U.S. soldiers withdrew in 2011, President Obama boasted they were "leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq." Three years later, the country is under the thumb of an authoritarian ruler, riddled with corruption, and trapped in horrific sectarian violence. Nearly every day, mammoth explosions rock the capital, Baghdad, and other cities, tearing apart restaurants, public markets, and government buildings; in April alone, 750 Iraqis were killed in bombings or in the fighting between government forces and a formidable Sunni extremist insurgency. If the increasingly authoritarian Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki manages to secure victory in April 30's parliamentary elections — the results of which will not be known for weeks — it could ignite a full-fledged civil war. "We were happy when the old dictator went," said Ramadi resident Faleh Shahooth, referring to the 2003 toppling of Saddam Hussein. "But democracy has brought a new dictator. If the election produces the same thieves again, then it's time for revolution."
What kind of leader is al-Maliki?
In power since 2006, al-Maliki secured re-election in 2010 by promising to form a national "unity" government with his rivals from the Sunni minority, who had previously governed Iraq under Saddam's Ba'athist regime. But within days of America's withdrawal, al-Maliki instigated a brutal crackdown on Sunnis from his vice president downward, purging the Iraqi National Intelligence Service and the government of sectarian rivals. Tens of thousands of political prisoners now wallow in Iraq's jails, while al-Maliki — who has declared himself commander in chief — has built up a series of intelligence files on his political opponents, ready to "call them out," in his words, if they dare criticize him. "Maliki could have been a historic figure," said former Vice President Adil Abdul-Mahdi. "The Shiites supported him; he had the support of the Sunnis and the Kurds." Instead, he has alienated large swaths of the population, and opened the door to a resurgence of Islamic militants. Jihadists from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), an al Qaeda–affiliated organization, are now firmly in control of Anbar province, the hard-won western Sunni heartland where some 1,300 U.S. soldiers lost their lives. ISIS is also waging war in neighboring Syria as part of a wider regional Sunni-Shiite struggle.
What about corruption?
It's blatant and widespread. In fact, al-Maliki's government has become a symbol of bribery and theft, with corrupt politicians siphoning off millions of dollars' worth of oil revenues from within the comfort of Baghdad's Green Zone. Abdul-Mahdi estimates that almost $220 billion has been allocated in the last few years to some 6,000 shady government projects, and another $70 billion in government loans has been handed out without being repaid. "The corruption is unbelievable," says political scientist Ghassan al-Atiyyah. "You can't get a job in the army or the government unless you pay; you can't even get out of prison unless you pay." That, combined with a dire lack of public services — including constant electricity shortages — has led to the sense that the overall standard of life in Iraq has only deteriorated since Saddam was toppled.
Are women at least better off?
Their political situation has improved: Under Iraq's postwar constitution, women are guaranteed 25 percent of the seats in parliament. But as conservative Shiite forces have gained a foothold within the government, the average female Iraqi has found herself with fewer rights than under Saddam. More than a quarter of women over the age of 12 in Iraq are illiterate; only 14 percent are either working or actively seeking employment. Perhaps the greatest symbol of Iraqi women's plight today is the Jaafari Personal Status Law, draft legislation approved by Iraq's Council of Ministers in February that lowers the marriage age for girls to 9, forbids women from leaving their homes without their husbands' consent, and legalizes marital rape. "This law means humiliation for women and for Iraqis in general," said female legislator Safia al-Suhail. "It shows that we are going backwards."
Will the elections change anything?
That all depends on who wins. If al-Maliki gets a plurality of votes and remains prime minister, more division and bloodshed are inevitable. He has already insisted he will use all his "energy and effort" to keep his fellow Shiites in full control, and spurn a "unity" coalition government with his Sunni and Kurdish rivals. Having painted himself as a heroic fighter against the Sunni "terrorists," al-Maliki enjoys significant support among the Shiite population, but is widely loathed among Sunnis, who see him as a despot and Iranian stooge. Backroom negotiations to select a prime minister are expected to take months, during which time al-Maliki is likely to use his considerable influence over Iraq's judiciary to get his desired result. "If we know anything about Prime Minister Maliki," said Ahmed Ali, an Iraq analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, "it's that he doesn't retreat easily."
The Kurdish success story
One part of Iraq has proved a surprising exception to the country's grim norm: the semi-autonomous Kurdish region, which lies 200 miles north of Baghdad. Kurdish Iraq is largely peaceful, prosperous, democratic, and secular. Corruption exists, but at a tolerable level: "In Kurdistan, the leaders steal about 20 percent," a Kurdish local told The New Yorker, "but 80 percent makes it to the people. In Baghdad, the percentages are reversed." Although already effectively independent from Iraq's central government, the Kurdish regional government has until this point eschewed formal independence in order to capitalize on Baghdad's oil revenues. But having apparently discovered its own huge oil reserves, the regional government is increasingly considering splitting with its violent southern neighbors. "We are talking about a culture of life," said Fuad Hussein, the Kurdish prime minister's chief of staff. "They are busy with a culture of death."}
http://theweek.com/article/index/261272/iraq-three-years-after-us-withdrawal
I wouldn't have expected anything else coming out of your mouth. Of course its the stupidest article you've read in a while... of course. It doesn't fit your mode of operation, so it just has to be stupid. Any opposing point of view is stupid... we understand.
The folks around here understand you. We know how smart you are. If we forget, you are there quick, fast and in a hurry to try to remind us...
The folks around here understand you. We know how smart you are. If we forget, you are there quick, fast and in a hurry to try to remind us...
The B word.
oh boy.
oh boy.
That is the stupidest article I've seen in quite a while.
It isn't just Iraq that is worse off - we totally destabilized the entire Middle Eat with that war.
At first I understood you to be saying that Saddam Hussein was a bad guy and suggesting that was justification for going to war.
Well, what about all the other bad guys in power? Should we invade their countries too?
Someone wrote that he knew for a fact that we knew for a fact that Iraq had NO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. He said this was true because had we actually believed that Saddam had WMDs we would have never invaded Iraq. And, after I thought about that I tend to agree with him. We have never invaded anyone with WMDs and we really have never even talked about it. At the time of the Iraq invasion I kept think about North Korea and wondering why no on saw Kim Jong-il as more of a threat than Saddam. NK has nothing but weapons. At least Iraq had oil to protect and to safeguard but Kim Jong-il had nothing at all to lose. It didn't make sense then and it still doesn't make any real sense. WMDs were never the reason we went to war.
It isn't just Iraq that is worse off - we totally destabilized the entire Middle Eat with that war.
At first I understood you to be saying that Saddam Hussein was a bad guy and suggesting that was justification for going to war.
Well, what about all the other bad guys in power? Should we invade their countries too?
Someone wrote that he knew for a fact that we knew for a fact that Iraq had NO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. He said this was true because had we actually believed that Saddam had WMDs we would have never invaded Iraq. And, after I thought about that I tend to agree with him. We have never invaded anyone with WMDs and we really have never even talked about it. At the time of the Iraq invasion I kept think about North Korea and wondering why no on saw Kim Jong-il as more of a threat than Saddam. NK has nothing but weapons. At least Iraq had oil to protect and to safeguard but Kim Jong-il had nothing at all to lose. It didn't make sense then and it still doesn't make any real sense. WMDs were never the reason we went to war.
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